Factor Utilization in Indian Manufacturing: A Look at the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys Data by Ana M. Fernandes & Ariel Pakes
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FACTOR UTILIZATION IN INDIAN MANUFACTURING:









This paper builds on a chapter by the same authors entitled "Evidence of Underemployment of Labor
and Capital in Indian Manufacturing" included in the World Bank South Asia Region report Accelerating
Growth and Job Creation in South Asia. The findings expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank. The views expressed herein are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Ana M. Fernandes and Ariel Pakes. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Factor Utilization in Indian Manufacturing: A Look at the World Bank Investment Climate
Surveys Data
Ana M. Fernandes and Ariel Pakes




We use the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys data to analyze the employment of both labor
and capital in Indian manufacturing. We focus on disparities among states in manufacturing employment















There has been some concern with the lack of growth, particularly of employment growth,
in Indian manufacturing, and its relationship to various institutional constraints. Partly
this is a result of the fact that the Indian manufacturing sector is much smaller than that
sector in other economies of similar size. Table 1 illustrates this fact. It indicates that
the manufacturing share of value added in India is smaller than that share in other large
developing economies, though it is similar to that share in smaller countries with GDP per
capita similar to that of India (Pakistan and Vietnam). However as Table 2 shows, the
growth rate of value added in manufacturing in India is noticeably lower than that in these
smaller similar income countries. Indeed the sectoral growth rate comparisons in Table 2 are
rather striking. The growth rate of value added in services in India is comparable to that in
China, and about 10 percentage points higher than that in any other country in our list. In
rather stark contrast the growth rate of value added in manufacturing in India is only about
a half that in China and Vietnam, and quite a bit lower than that in Pakistan.
Why is the relative performance of the Indian manufacturing sector, relative both to the
service sector and to the manufacturing sectors in other comparable countries, so poor and
what are its implications for employment and income distribution in India? This paper uses
the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys to examine a component of this question. In
particular we analyze the labor and capital employment rates of Indian manufacturing ﬁrms
and their relationship to productivity and various institutional constraints.
Several researchers have argued that the restrictiveness of labor market regulations in
India is one of the most important constraints on the performance of its manufacturing
sector. Our analysis focuses exclusively on the formal (organized) manufacturing sector in
India for which data is available and to which labor market regulations are applicable.1
1Indeed recent data from the ILO and OECD (2007) suggest that overall employment growth in India
between 2000 and 3005 was a quite rapid 2.8% per annum (compared to only 1% in China). However the
OECD (2007) also reports that close to 90% of the population employed in India work in the informal sector
(versus only 50% in China), and there is some indication that the recent strong job creation in India has
2Labor market regulations are described in detail in Ahsan and Pages (2005) and in World
Bank (2006). Here we only point out the most controversial of those regulations: the 1982
amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 which made the ﬁring of workers
illegal for ﬁrms employing more than 100 workers except with previous permission from the
appropriate state government.
The evidence indicates that the permission to ﬁre workers is rarely granted (see Ahsan
and Pages, 2005). Early work by Fallon and Lucas (1991) found that the introduction of
employment laws restricting the ﬁring of workers in India led to a substantial decline in
the demand for labor by manufacturing industries. Hence, the objective of the regulations
- to protect jobs - resulted in fewer jobs being created. More recently, Besley and Burgess
(2004) ﬁnd that Indian states which amended labor market regulations to make them more
restrictive (i.e., to give greater protection to workers) experience lower output, lower em-
ployment, lower investment, and lower productivity in the manufacturing sector. Ahsan and
Pages (2005) also ﬁnd important employment losses in Indian manufacturing as a result of
restrictive regulations on the ﬁring of workers, particularly in labor-intensive industries such
as textiles.
In this paper we ask whether factor employment in manufacturing ﬁrms in India is “ab-
normally” low or “abnormally” high conditional on: (i) ﬁrm productivity, (ii) the amount
of other factors employed by ﬁrms, and (iii) the factor costs faced by ﬁrms. With respect
to labor our measure of “abnormal” is constructed as the ratio of (1) the labor employment
that would be optimal for the ﬁrm if there were no hiring and ﬁring costs (or constraints),
and (2) the ﬁrm’s actual employment of labor. That is, if our measure, which we will call
“underutilization of labor”, for a ﬁrm equals x then a ﬁrm without hiring and ﬁring costs
that had the same productivity, capital and factor costs as the given ﬁrm would increase its
demand for labor relative to the given ﬁr mb yaf a c t o ro fx .T og e tad i ﬀerent perspective
been mostly ”bad” jobs i.e., those in the informal sector. For example the OECD (2007) report estimates
that growth in formal employment in urban China is much higher than growth in formal employment in
urban India in the same period (3.1% versus 1.7%).
3on the implications of the empirical magnitudes obtained we also compute the percentage
diﬀerence between the actual cost of labor and the cost of labor that would make a ﬁrm
without hiring and ﬁring costs just satisﬁed with its current labor employment.
We then look at diﬀerences in our underutilization of labor measure across Indian states,
and at the relationship between our underutilization of labor measures and measures of pro-
ductivity, underutilization of capital (described below), and data on institutional constraints
to doing business collected by the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys. We ﬁnd very
large diﬀerences in the extent of underutilization of labor across Indian states. Although
it is probably impossible to eliminate all the employment constraints faced by Indian man-
ufacturing ﬁrms, we might think it is possible that the states with “poorly functioning”
labor markets, that is states with large underutilization of labor, could, with institutional
improvements, approach the ﬁgures for underutilization of labor in those states with better
functioning markets. We delve deeper into the meaning of the expression “poorly func-
tioning” in the last part of the paper where we summarize the relationship between our
underutilization ﬁgures and other characteristics of the ﬁrm and the states it operates in.
We want to be clear at the outset that our underutilization ﬁgures should not be taken
as literal predictions of what would happen to the manufacturing demand for labor were
policy-makers to eliminate all hiring and ﬁr i n gc o s t si nag i v e ns t a t e . T h i sb e c a u s ew e r e
policy-makers to eliminate these costs and constraints for all ﬁrms in a state and the ﬁrms
began to respond by employing more labor, the cost of labor would likely rise, and the output
price would likely fall below what our current estimates predict (the current estimates do
not account for the impact of an increase of a ﬁrm’s competitors quantities on the ﬁrm’s own
sales). These two processes would decrease the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue product for labor and
hence their incentive to hire more workers. For precise predictions of what would happen
to employment patterns in a state where labor market institutions would be improved, we
would need to analyze a general equilibrium model which endogenized both the wage rate
and the output prices of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. Developing such a model is left
for future research.
This paper also considers an analogous measure of “underutilization” of capital. This
4measure is constructed as the ratio of: (1) the optimal capital for the ﬁrm if there were
perfect rental markets for capital goods, and (2) the ﬁrm’s actual capital stock. The perfect
rental markets concept is quite abstract; it assumes that ﬁrms could rent each diﬀerent kind
of capital good at an annual rental cost equal to the sum of the current rate of interest
on loans to manufacturing ﬁrms plus the depreciation rate on those capital goods. Still our
results on capital are both comforting in that they correspond to our intuitions on the capital
market, and surprising in how diﬀerent they are from our labor underutilization patterns.
In particular there is evidence that capital markets are much better at arbitraging dif-
ferences across states than labor markets. First, the diﬀerences in both the cost of capital
and the underutilization of capital across states are noticeably smaller than the diﬀerences
in both labor costs and the underutilization of labor across states and the magnitudes are
striking. The interstate variance in the percentage underutilization of labor is about three
and a half times the interstate variance in the percentage underutilization of capital. Sec-
ond, though we obtain large positive numbers for the underutilization of labor, that is labor
is “underutilized” compared to what would happen if there were no hiring and ﬁring costs
or constraints, the numbers for the underutilization of capital are negative. That is, given
the amount of labor employed by ﬁrms, ﬁrm productivity, and cost of capital, ﬁrms are
employing more capital than they would employ if they were facing perfect rental markets
for capital goods.
Of course the overutilization of capital may just be a response to the fact that ﬁrms are
underutilizing labor. That is, ﬁrms which face many constraints in the hiring and ﬁring
of workers may respond by increasing their use of capital relative to labor. Indeed, as
we show below, ﬁrms which underutilize labor disproportionately tend to overutilize capital
disproportionately. Moreover it is clear that if labor employment were to rise, say in response
to an improvement in labor market institutions, the marginal revenue product of the capital
in place would rise, and our measure of the overutilization of capital would fall. Moreover
the overutilization of capital ﬁgures that we obtain are much smaller in magnitude than the
underutilization of labor ﬁgures. Consequently, improvements in labor market regulations
that may be feasible may well also eliminate the overutilization of capital. Unfortunately to
5answer whether this is likely to be true we would require a more detailed general equilibrium
model alluded to above.
The last section of this paper investigates the reduced form relationships (i) among our
measures of underutilization of labor, underutilization of capital, and productivity, and (ii)
between these three measures and answers to questions posed on the investment climate
survey. Perhaps the most striking ﬁnding of this analysis is that the extent of underutilization
of labor by a ﬁrm is strongly and positively related to the ﬁrm’s productivity. The more
productive ﬁrms also tend to overutilize capital somewhat more than the average, though not
to the same extent that they underutilize labor. The results in prior sections indicated that
liberalizing the labor market in states where there is high underutilization of labor is likely
to result in signiﬁcant increases in both labor demand and wages in those states. The results
in the last section give us reason to believe that a lowering of labor market constraints would
also increase productivity, and it would do so without signiﬁcant increases in the demand for
capital. We should expect an increase in productivity both because the more productive ﬁrms
are likely to increase their output disproportionately, and because each ﬁrm’s productivity
should increase as labor and capital employment move towards their eﬃcient levels.
Other relevant reduced form ﬁndings include the following: (i) ﬁrms which suﬀer more
production losses due to electricity outages are less productive than the average ﬁrm in their
states, and ﬁrms in states in which the average production losses due to outages are high
underutilize labor and capital more than ﬁrms in states with less frequent outages, (ii) ﬁrms
reporting more problems with corruption are the more productive ﬁrms in the state and
they have relatively high underutilization of both factors of production, (ii) within states,
it is the relatively more productive ﬁrms that are more likely to receive loans, suggesting
that the loan-granting institutions are able to select out the more productive ﬁrms, and (iv)
states in which a disproportionate number of ﬁrms received loans are the states with less
underutilization of both factors of production, particularly of capital.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section
3 describes the computation of the underutilization measures. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the
underutilization of labor and capital, respectively. Section 6 analyzes productivity. Section
67 discusses the relationships between underutilization of labor and capital, productivity, and
investment climate variables. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data.
Our analysis requires the use of data on factors of production and sales for manufacturing
ﬁrms in India. Our data is taken from the Investment Climate Surveys conducted in India
jointly by the World Bank and the Confederation of Indian Industry in two rounds: 2002 and
2005. The surveys cover formal manufacturing ﬁrms across 12 Indian states and 7 industries
based on a random sample designed to be representative of the population of ﬁrms according
to their industry and location.2 The surveys provide information on ﬁrm characteristics,
investment climate variables, and accounting variables. Accounting variables were collected
for the two years immediately preceding the administration of the two survey rounds (2001
and 2004) as well as for prior years through retrospective questions. To avoid measurement
problems associated with retrospective data, we use only the accounting variables for 2001
and 2004. The 2005 survey round covered all ﬁrms from the 2002 survey round that were
still in business and willing to respond to the questionnaire as well as additional ﬁrms not
covered in the 2002 survey round. Appendix A provides more details on the data and shows
some descriptive statistics for the sample.
3 Ingredients for the Underutilization Measures:
Production Functions and Factor Costs.
In order to obtain our measures of the underutilization of labor (capital) we need to know
what labor (capital) employment would be for a ﬁrm facing no hiring and ﬁring costs or
constraints (perfect rental markets for capital goods). For this purpose we use:
2For simplicity, we refer to the units in our analysis as ﬁrms, but the surveys cover establishments.
7• estimates of a production function, or more precisely of a “sales generating” function,
• estimates of the cost of employing labor (capital).
The availability of a sales generating function enables the calculation of the increment in
s a l e sf o rau n i ti n c r e a s eo fe m p l o y m e n ta td i ﬀerent employment levels for each ﬁrm. The labor
that the ﬁrm would employ if there were no hiring and ﬁring costs or constraints is obtained as
the labor employment level that would set the ﬁrm’s increment in sales due to a new worker
exactly equal to the cost of employing that worker. An increment in labor employment
above this “statically optimal” level would generate more labor costs than sales, and a labor
employment level below this static optimum would mean that the ﬁrm would increase sales
more than costs if it increased its number of workers. Our estimates of underutilization of
capital are obtained analogously based on the cost of capital.
3.1 Sales Generating Functions.
The term “sales generating” function was introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) to emphasize
that the fact that they were analyzing the relationship between sales (deﬂated by a producer
price index) and the inputs that went into producing those sales, rather than the relation-
ship between physical quantities of outputs and inputs as in a production function. When
working with sales data from homogenous product industries, we can insure that we are an-
alyzing the determinants of the physical quantity of output by allowing for industry speciﬁc
multiplicative constant terms, which account for inter-industry price diﬀerences. Though in
our analysis we allow for a separate multiplicative constant for the 7 diﬀerent industries,
the homogenous product paradigm is a stretch for our data. In fact, the dependent variable
u s e di no u ra n a l y s i si st h es a l e sg e n e r a t e db yaﬁrm operating in a diﬀerentiated product
industry.
This leaves us with the question of whether the relationship that we are estimating
has a natural interpretation, and if that interpretation has consequences for the choice of
estimation procedure or for subsequent use of the estimates. We will assume that each
8ﬁrm’s demand curve has a constant elasticity conditional on the output (or prices) of the
other ﬁrms, and that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Then there is a log-log
relationship between sales and inputs, just as there is a log-log relationship between output
and inputs in the Cobb-Douglas production function case, but now the objects in that log-log
relationship have a slightly diﬀerent interpretation. Diﬀerences in productivity in generating
sales will reﬂect the sum of diﬀerences in the location of demand curves and diﬀerences
in the ability to transform inputs into physical output. The input coeﬃcients estimated
from the sales generating function will reﬂect the physical production function coeﬃcients
divided by one minus the inverse elasticity of demand. As a result, (i) whenever we consider
counterfactuals which change the output of competing ﬁrms, we should expect each ﬁrm’s
“sales productivity” to change, and (ii) we should be careful not to interpret our estimates
of returns to scale as scale eﬀects in the production of physical output.
We will use our sales generating function estimates in two ways: (1) to construct the
distribution of ﬁrm productivity in producing sales, and (2) to measure the excess demand
(supply) for labor and/or capital at the going wage (rental) rate. The measure of ﬁrm
productivity is sales divided by an index of inputs. We need the sales generating function
estimates to obtain the weights used to construct the index of inputs. Our measure of excess
demand (supply) is the number of units of labor (capital) that a ﬁrm would have to hire
before the marginal revenue product of labor (capital) would equal the going wage (rental)
rate. The marginal revenue product schedule is the derivative of the sales generating function
with respect to the input, and hence also requires estimates of the sales generating function.
Subsequent sections of the paper address the substantive implications of our productivity
and excess demand measures.
The correct way to obtain sales generating function estimates depends on the appropriate
model for input demand and for ﬁrm exit. This because the residual in the sales equation
is productivity, and ﬁrms’ input and exit decisions will depend on their productivity. As a
result both an endogeneity and a selection issue must be accounted for before one can obtain
reliable estimates. The endogeneity issue is that the residual in the equation of interest
is correlated with the variables (the inputs) on the right hand side of that equation. The
9selection issue is that small ﬁrms (ﬁrms with a low capital stock or other sunk investments)
continue (do not exit) only if their productivity is quite large, while large ﬁrms will continue
even with lower productivity. As a result, the distribution of productivity of the ﬁrms that
survive, and hence are included in the data on transitions in productivity, is not independent
of the quantity of capital.
The next subsection describes our estimation procedure. The reader who is not interested
in the technical details of how the estimates are obtained should be able to skip this section
and still understand the remainder of the paper.
3.1.1 Estimation Procedure.
We now describe how we obtained the sales generating function estimates. The basic frame-
work for estimation is taken from Olley and Pakes (1996), but we modiﬁed their estimation
techniques to account for special features of the institutional setting in Indian manufacturing,
as explained below.3
Let (yj,t,l j,t,k j,t,i j,t,z j,t) be value added (sales minus material inputs), labor, capital,
investment, and temporary labor for ﬁrm j in year t. All of these variables, except investment,
are in logs. Temporary labor is deﬁned as all (paid) short-term (i.e., for less than a year)
employees with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract, while permanent labor is
deﬁned as all paid workers that are not temporary. Our sales generating function is given
by:
yj,t = βllj,t + βkkj,t + βzzj,t + ωj,t + ηj,t,
where we have written the disturbance as a sum of ωj,t and ηj,t. ωj,t is deﬁned to be the
productivity that the ﬁrm expects for the period given its information at the time when
investment decisions are made (which we take to be the beginning of the period). ηj,t is
deﬁned to be the diﬀerence between the actual realization of the productivity term and the
3See part 2 of Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) for a more in-depth discussion of why and
how one might want to modify the framework in Olley and Pakes (1996).
10ﬁrm’s expectation. If there is measurement error in sales it will also be included in ηj,t.
Our goal is to obtain estimates of the coeﬃcients (βl,βk,βz) with desirable properties.
The problem is that due to the selection and endogeneity problems, standard estimators for
those coeﬃcients — including OLS, ﬁxed eﬀects, and instrumental variables — will produce
inconsistent estimates of these parameters. In particular, (i) the distribution of the ωj,t which
we observe has been truncated by an exit decision whose truncation point depends on the
right-hand side variables, and (ii) since the productivities in the truncated distribution are
known to the ﬁrm at the beginning of the period and correlated over time, any reasonable
model for input choice will result in those productivities being correlated with the ﬁrm’s
labor and capital inputs.
Since ωj,t is deﬁned to be the expected productivity at the time when the investment
decision is made, Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the investment function (ij,t)c a nb e
written as a function of ωj,t and other “dynamic factors”. Dynamic factors are the factors
of production which the ﬁrm ﬁnds costly to adjust over the period between investment
decisions, so that past levels of one of those factors aﬀect the current employment of that
factor independently of current cost and demand conditions. In Industrial Organization
terminology, dynamic factors are “state” variables in the dynamic problem that leads to the
ﬁrm’s investment choices. Olley and Pakes assume that labor is not a dynamic factor (i.e.,
labor can be adjusted optimally in every period). However, given the structure of the labor
laws in India, we shall also try speciﬁcations where labor is considered a dynamic factor.
Since we try diﬀerent speciﬁcations where the set of factors which are dynamic varies, we
change our notation slightly here and let xd denote the list of dynamic factors and xs be a
list of the static factors (i.e., those factors of production which can be adjusted optimally in
every period).





j,t is a vector of dynamic factors. The function it(·) diﬀers across periods because it
depends on the state variables of competing ﬁr m s ,a n dt h el i s to fs t a t ev a r i a b l e si nag i v e n









Substituting equation (1) into the sales generating function, using the new notation for the






















x) are the coeﬃcients of the static and dynamic inputs, respectively.
If (xd
j,t,x s
j,t) cannot respond to movements in ηj,t, that is if those factors of production
cannot respond to changes in productivity that occur between the time when investment is
made and the time when production occurs, then equation (??) can be estimated by ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) using a polynomial (or any other suﬃciently rich non-parametric
function) to approximate φ(ij,t;xd
j,t). If not, then equation (??) can be estimated by instru-
mental variables using lagged values of the production factors that are correlated with ηj,t as
instruments. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that none of the production factors can adjust
to realizations of ηj,t, but we will try alternative possibilities, as shown below. Let (ˆ β
s
x, ˆ φj,t)
be the estimates obtained in this manner.
We still require estimates of β
d
x. To obtain these estimates, we need to account for
selection bias and this, in turn, requires a model for the exit decision. We let χt+1 =1
indicate the ﬁrm continues and χt+1 =0indicate exit. Olley and Pakes show that provided
{ωj,t} evolves as a Markov Process, the exit decision can be written as:4
4More precisely, we treat {ωj,t} as a univariate Markov Process. This is where our assumptions are likely
at odds with our model of a sales generating function from a diﬀerentiated product market. If ωj,t includes
at e r mw h i c hr e ﬂects the location of the individual ﬁrm’s demand curve (as well as a term that reﬂects its
physical productivity), then the assumption that the ﬁrm’s own physical productivity evolves as a Markov
process does not guarantee that ωj,t evolves as a Markov process. For now, we simply treat the Markov
12χt+1 =1 ⇔ ωj,t+1 ≥ ωt+1(x
d
j,t).














where F(·) is a distribution function. Note that, for any given ω, the function F(·) is










We will use this fact below.
From equation (1), ωj,t = ht(ij,t,x d
j,t). Substituting this into equation (3) shows that our
































We can now return to the issue of estimating β
d
x.C o n s i d e rp e r i o dt+1. We only observe





































where the ﬁrst equality uses equations (1) and (4), the last equation deﬁnes ˜ g(·),a n d
ξj,t+1 ≡ ωj,t+1 − E[ωj,t+1|ωj,t,χt+1 =1 ] .
assumption as a convenient approximation to a more complicated process, an approximation which has done

















+ ξj,t+1 + ηj,t+1. (5)
This equation can be consistently estimated by substituting our consistent estimates of
(β
s
x,Fj,t,φt(·)) for their true values and approximating ˜ g(·) with a suﬃciently rich non-
parametric function. If any of the xd can respond to realizations of ξ or η then lagged values
of those variables must be used in forming the moments to be used in the estimation.
3.1.2 Estimation Results.
The sales generating function estimates we report combine survey data for Indian manufac-
turing ﬁrms in all 7 industries (listed in Appendix A) but allow for industry speciﬁc average
levels of (the log of) productivity. While we attempted to estimate a sales generating function
for each industry separately, the data was not rich enough to determine industry diﬀerences
in input coeﬃcients in a reliable way. Table 3 presents a selection of our results in two panels.
Panel A does not allow the sales generating function coeﬃcients to diﬀer by ﬁrm size, while
Panel B allows small ﬁrms, deﬁned as those with less than 50 employees, to have diﬀerent
coeﬃcients relative to large ﬁrms. Since we will investigate later in the paper diﬀerences
in productivity by ﬁrm size, we wanted to ensure that any diﬀerences we ﬁnd then were
not simply a result of ﬁrms below a certain size cutoﬀ being engaged in activities that were
diﬀerent enough to warrant diﬀerent sales generating function coeﬃcients. The estimation of
diﬀerent coeﬃcients across ﬁrm size also accommodates a special feature of the Indian man-
ufacturing sector which is its inclusion of a much larger share of relatively small ﬁrms than
the manufacturing sectors in other economies. This is illustrated in Figure 1 which compares
the size distribution of ﬁrms in India to that in China, Brazil, and Indonesia, based on data
from Investment Climate Surveys. When examining whether there were diﬀerences in sales
generating function coeﬃcients by ﬁrm size, we found that the largest diﬀerences occurred
for the 50 employee cutoﬀ reported in Table 3.
We will focus on the estimates that allow for diﬀerent coeﬃcients across small and large
ﬁrms (Panel B) as Table 3 provides some evidence that such diﬀerences exist, particularly
14in the labor and temporary labor coeﬃcients. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS estimates
for the full sample and for the subsample of observations for which investment diﬀers from
zero, respectively. As discussed in the previous subsection, to obtain our sales generating
function estimates we can only use observations with positive investment, as it is only then
that the investment can be used to help control for prior values of productivity which must
be controlled for in order to get unbiased estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest.
Columns 3 and 4 show the standard Olley and Pakes estimators. Column 3 shows esti-
mates that control only for the endogeneity of input choices, while the estimates in column
4 control also for the selection bias induced by exit. In moving from Column 2 to column
3, we are controlling for the fact that the capital and labor inputs are likely to be positively
correlated with the residual (which, recall, includes productivity). Thus, we expect to see a
fall in input coeﬃcients, which we do, and a fall in the estimate of “returns to scale”, in this
case one which is reasonably dramatic. As explained earlier, the fact that larger ﬁrms will
continue in operation with lower values of productivity than smaller ﬁrms induces a negative
correlation between capital and the residual in the estimates in column 3. Therefore, when
we move from column 3 to column 4 we expect to see an increase in the capital coeﬃcients,
which again is reasonably dramatic. These results are similar to those found in Olley and
Pakes (1996).
Columns 5 and 6 diﬀer from prior results, including those in columns 3 and 4, by allowing
labor to not be fully adjustable in the short run. These speciﬁcations accommodate a special
feature of the Indian manufacturing sector which are the stringent labor market regulations
it faces. Thus, hiring and ﬁring costs for labor cannot be taken to be negligible as in the
earlier production function estimation literature which assumed that labor can be optimized
in the short-run. If labor is partially ﬁxed, then the results in columns 3 and 4 combine the
impact of the quantity of labor in place on investment for a given capital stock — an eﬀect
t h a tw ew o u l de x p e c tt ob ep o s i t i v e—w i t ht h ee ﬀect of labor on output conditional on capital
(with the sales generating function coeﬃcient of interest). Accordingly, we would expect the
labor coeﬃcient estimates in columns 5 and 6 to be smaller than those in columns 3 and
4. Again we get quite a striking eﬀect providing evidence that in Indian manufacturing we
15should think of labor as not being freely adjustable in the short run. Note also that allowing
labor to be partially ﬁxed brings down the estimates of the “returns to scale” noticeably.
We note that none of these estimates allow either temporary or permanent labor to adjust
to the shocks in productivity that occur during the period. We did some investigation of
this possibility, but the speciﬁc a t i o n si nc o l u m n s5a n d6s e e mt ob ea sr i c has p e c i ﬁcation
as our data can support. That is, further reﬁnements resulted in large increases in standard
errors, and no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in coeﬃcients from those reported above.
3.2 Factor Costs: Labor.
We begin by discussing labor costs. The immobility of labor across states could enable
interstate diﬀerences in labor costs to develop. Also, our analysis treats permanent labor
as a homogenous product. Unfortunately, information on schooling that would allow us to
diﬀerentiate workers in our analysis was not consistently available. As a result our under-
utilization of labor estimates should probably be interpreted as underutilization of labor
for the same mix of workers as the ﬁrms are currently employing. However if some types
of workers contribute more to the ﬁrm’s output than others, and there are systematically
diﬀerent fractions of diﬀerent types of workers in diﬀerent industries, then this would imply
that we should allow for diﬀerent costs of labor in diﬀerent industries.
To determine whether we should allow the costs of labor to vary by industry or by state
we estimated a regression of average wages from our survey on industry and state dummies.
The industry dummies were neither jointly nor individually signiﬁcant, whereas many of
the state dummies were signiﬁcant. Consequently, we allowed for diﬀerences in labor costs
across states but not across industries. Table 3 provides the state level average wages from
the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) using the most inclusive deﬁnition of wage
in that survey, and compares them to the average wages in our survey. We use the ASI
wages in what follows since the ASI sample is more representative than our sample, and
because for the vast majority of states ASI wages are higher than the average wages from
our survey. Hence, by using the ASI wages we will, if anything, underestimate the extent of
16labor underutilization.
3.3 Factor Costs: Capital.
Table 4 shows the state level averages of our measures of the components of the cost of
capital. The Indian ASI contains measures of average interest rates on loans and average
depreciation rates of capital. Our cost of capital measure is the sum of these two averages.
Our surveys provide a measure of the interest rate on loans. The mean and median of this
measure for each state are shown in the last two columns of the table, and they are quite
similar to the interest rates from the Indian ASI.
Note that there is much less variance in the cost of capital across states than there is
in the cost of labor. The coeﬃcient of variation of the cost of capital across states is only
half that of wages (15 and 14% in 2001 and 2004, versus 28 and 30%, respectively). We also
regressed the average interest rate of loans from our survey on industry and state dummies.
The industry nor the state dummies were neither jointly nor individually signiﬁcant. Recall
that the state dummies were signiﬁcant in the wage regression. This diﬀerence suggests that
capital markets in India are able to arbitrage interstate diﬀerences in the returns to capital
reasonably eﬀectively while labor markets and labor ﬂows are much less able to arbitrage
interstate diﬀerences in the returns to labor. Still for consistency with the labor results we
use the cost of capital from the ASI and allow it to vary across states in the calculations
that follow.
4 Underutilization of Labor.
The most striking result that we obtain is the extent of underutilization of labor across
manufacturing ﬁrms in India. Overall we estimate underutilization of 5.8 times current
manufacturing employment in 2001, and 3.4 times in 2004. Further underutilization is
estimated to be large and positive for every size group of ﬁr m s( s e eF i g u r e2 )a n de v e r y
state (see Table 5) in India.
17The extent of underutilization of labor varies dramatically across states. Higher GDP per
capita states have less underutilization. A similar correlation is evident in the time series
dimension. Table 6 and Figure 3 compare the changes in underutilization of labor by state
to the changes in GDP per capita by state between 2001 and 2004 across states. Again there
is a striking negative correlation. Indeed if we omit one outlier, West Bengal (which exhibits
a very large decline in the underutilization of labor), the data look like they were generated
by a simple linear model. That is high GDP per capita states exhibit less underutilization of
labor, and states where underutilization is falling are states whose per capita GDP is rising.
Uttar Pradesh has the lowest GDP per capita and the second lowest growth rate in GDP
per capita, and hence is considered a “lagging region”. It has both the highest percentage
underutilization of labor and the highest growth rate in that percentage (indeed it is one of
the few states where underutilization is in fact growing).
To put these ﬁgures in a diﬀerent light we calculated what the wage would have had
to be for the ﬁrm’s current employment to be “statically optimal” (i.e., the wage equal
to the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue product of labor at its current employment level). Across
manufacturing ﬁrms this wage averaged 6.8 times the current wage rates in 2001 and 4.6 times
the current wage rates in 2004. Moreover in the three states with highest underutilization
of labor - Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal - this wage averaged about
9 times the actual wage in the state, a number which is probably larger than the average
tenure of a manufacturing worker. In contrast in Delhi, which was the state with the lowest
underutilization of labor, the wage averaged about 20% of a worker’s year’s wages. If nothing
more the large divergence in these numbers across states suggest a role for the impact of
diﬀerential labor market regulations across states.
The extent of underutilization of labor did decrease signiﬁcantly between 2001 and 2004.
The decrease in underutilization occurred in all size groups of ﬁrms, but it was most pro-
nounced among ﬁr m sw i t h5 0t o1 0 0w o r k e r s( s e eF i g u r e2 ) .T h es i z ec u t o ﬀ at which ﬁrms
must start abiding with restrictive employment regulations in most Indian states is 100
workers, so there is some indication that institutional changes have moderated the impact
of those regulations during this period. We note that this occurred at the same time as the
18fraction of the manufacturing labor force employed by ﬁrms in the 50 to 100 worker group
increased, so the fall in underutilization of labor in this group was not a result of this size
group discarding a disproportionate number of workers. A related fact is that there was a
distinct tendency over this period for manufacturing employment to shift from large ﬁrms
(with more than 250 workers) to moderately sized ﬁrms (with 50 to 250 workers).5
5 Underutilization of Capital.
The diﬀerences between our estimates of the underutilization of capital and that of labor are
striking. In particular there is overutilization of capital; i.e., the marginal revenue product of
the capital employed at ﬁrms tends to be less than the cost of capital. As Table 7 and Figure
4 show, this is true for all size classes of ﬁrms and all states in 2001 and in 2004. Indeed the
overutilization of capital is, on average, equal to about three quarters of the capital stock.
This magnitude is much smaller than the corresponding magnitudes for the underutiliza-
tion of labor. To see this in a more intuitive way we calculated what the cost of capital
would have had to be for the ﬁrm’s current capital to be ”statically optimal” (i.e., the cost
of capital equal to the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue product of capital at its current capital level).
On average this “statically optimal” cost of capital was 58% of the current cost of capital in
2001 and 64% in 2004. These numbers are diﬀerent from one, but only by about 40% (recall
that the underutilization of labor resulted in ratios of wage rates to marginal productivity of
labor of about 600%). Moreover, unlike the ﬁgures on underutilization of labor, the extent
of overutilization of capital did not change much between 2001 and 2004, it does not vary
much across states or size groups, and it is not correlated with diﬀerences in GDP per capita
across states.6
5See Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
6Interestingly, we also ﬁnd evidence of important underutilization of labor and overutilization of capital in
another South Asian country with restrictive labor regulations: Sri Lanka. See Appendix B for a discussion
of those results.
196 Manufacturing Productivity.
While the focus of this paper is not on the determinants of total factor productivity in the
Indian manufacturing sector, we are interested in the relationship between our underutiliza-
tion measures and productivity. Therefore we now discuss one ﬁnding on manufacturing
productivity that is of interest to the subsequent results. It is presented in Table 8 and the
accompanying Figure 5 and Figure 6.
The table and ﬁgures show that interstate diﬀerences in average manufacturing produc-
tivity are not positively correlated with interstate diﬀerences in GDP per capita. The precise
nature of the relationship between manufacturing productivity and GDP per capita diﬀers
depending on whether we consider a sales share weighted average of ﬁrm productivity, or an
unweighted average of ﬁrm productivity. However it is clear that among all states except
the very high GDP per capita states there is a negative relationship between manufacturing
productivity and GDP per capita, though the relationship ﬂattens out and may turn positive
among the highest GDP per capita states. If states with higher GDP per capita are states in
which overall productivity is higher, the higher productivity levels are coming from sectors
other than manufacturing (e.g., services).
7 The Relationships Between Our Underutilization Mea-
sures, Our Productivity Measures, and Responses to
the Investment Climate Survey.
In this section we discuss the ﬁndings from a reduced form analysis of the relationships
between our ﬁrm-level underutilization measures and ﬁrm-level productivity, and the rela-
tionships between these three variables and the responses to questions in the investment
climate survey. To facilitate the analysis we estimated a three-equation system using our
measures of the underutilization of labor, the underutilization of capital, and productivity,
20as dependent variables. The “explanatory” variables are the same in all equations, and they
are all based on information from the investment climate surveys. We put the word “ex-
planatory” in quotation marks because we want to emphasize that we make no attempt to
infer cause and eﬀect from the estimates. We present them only as correlations that a causal
model would have to rationalize. The estimates were obtained using seemingly unrelated
regression techniques and are shown in Table 9.
The variables from the investment climate survey included were the fraction of the ﬁrm’s
workforce that is unionized, whether the ﬁrm had a loan, production losses at the ﬁrm due
to electricity outages, an indicator of corruption in inspections, the state-year level averages
of these variables among the ﬁrms in our data set, and the average share of temporary labor
in total employment in the state-year (as an indicator of ﬂexibility of local labor markets).
Since for each included ﬁrm level variable we include also the state-year level averages of these
variables, the eﬀects of the ﬁrm level variables should be interpreted as within coeﬃcients;
i.e., they provide the impact on the dependent variable of the diﬀerence between the right
hand side variable and the average of that right hand side variable in the given state-year.7
We begin with the coeﬃcients from the equation which has productivity as the left hand
side variable, i.e. column 3 in Table 9. All four of the ﬁrm level variables have signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in this equation. The estimated positive coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm level unionization
variable indicates that ﬁrms with a larger fraction of their labor force unionized are more
productive than the average ﬁrm in their state. This ﬁnding could either be a result of it being
easier to unionize in more productive ﬁrms, or of unionization increasing productivity. All the
coeﬃcients on the state-year level variables are more diﬃcult to interpret as the link between
a change in the value of the covariate they are attached to and the ﬁrm level outcomes of
interest is indirect. Still if there are regional economies to organizing union activities, the fact
7The ”explanatory” variables are described in detail in Appendix Table 5. For the within intepretation
see Mundlak (1978) who shows that one can allow for group speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in linear equations by
including, as additional right hand side variables, the group speciﬁc averages of all included right hand side
variables.
21that the average level of unionization in the state-year is positively related to productivity
would reinforce the possibility that unions ﬁnd it easier to unionize where manufacturing
productivity is higher. Note that the results in Table 9 also indicate that states with a higher
degree of unionization tend to be states with relatively high underutilization of both capital
and labor. Of course this need not be causal; it may be that there are omitted variables that
cause underutilization and are correlated with state level unionization.
The relationships between productivity and the other ﬁrm speciﬁc variables are somewhat
easier to interpret. Since our productivity estimates take direct account of the impact of cap-
ital on sales, the most obvious interpretation of the positive interaction between productivity
and the ﬁrm level loan variable is that loan-granting institutions are able to select out the
higher productivity ﬁrms in a region. In contrast, the corresponding state-year level variable
indicates that the states in which a disproportionately high number of ﬁrms received loans
were states with lower manufacturing productivity. About three quarters of loans granted
in India are granted by governmental institutions, so the regional pattern of loans might
reﬂect the goals of those institutions. The states in which a disproportionate share of ﬁrms
has loans are states in which ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly less underutilization of both labor and
capital. We note that this ﬁnding is not a result of states with a higher fraction of ﬁrms
having loans being states which are more developed, at least if we measure development by
GDP per capita. We tried adding GDP per capita as a right hand side variable to all equa-
tions. None of the results presented in Table 9 changed notably, and the GDP per capita
coeﬃcients were all insigniﬁcant.
Provided not all production losses due to electricity outages were planned for we would
expect the ﬁrms within a region that experience a higher fraction of their output lost due
to electrical outages to have lower productivity, and this is what the results in Table 9
indeed show. Also provided that average production losses across a state inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s
perceptions about its own likely future production losses, we should expect a relationship
between the state-year level measure of electricity outages and the employment of inputs
that have a sunk component to their cost, and recall that we have found both labor and
capital should be treated as inputs with sunk costs in India. As a result the strong positive
22relationship between the state-year level measure of production losses due to outages and
both our underutilization measures should not be a surprise either. Interestingly, there is a
positive relationship between productivity and the average production losses due to outages
across state-years. This ﬁnding suggests that states where manufacturing is productive are
the states which are pushing the boundaries of current electricity generating capacity.
The ﬁrm level corruption variable has a positive coeﬃcient in the productivity equation,
a ﬁnding that might reﬂect the possibility that it is the more productive ﬁrms that are most
averse to corruption and therefore most likely to complain about it. The ﬁrm and state
level coeﬃcients on corruption in the utilization equations are opposite in sign. Firms which
complain about corruption tend to employ less labor and capital, ceteris paribus, than other
ﬁrms in the region. On the other hand the average number of complaints about corruption
is higher in states with less underutilization of labor and capital.
None of the other ﬁrm level variables exhibit a signiﬁcant relationship to either underuti-
lization variable. Indeed the most striking information on the underutilization variables is
contained in the residuals. Note ﬁrst that the residual variance in both the underutilization
regressions is about 98% of the total variance, and about 97% of that variance is within state
variance. Given this, the residual covariances imply that the variable most closely related to
underutilization of labor in our data is ﬁrm level productivity. That is the more productive
ﬁrms in a region are holding back on hiring relatively more than less productive ﬁrms in the
same region. Consequently if we were able to institute changes in labor regulations which
resulted in all ﬁrms hiring labor up to the point where the marginal revenue product of labor
equaled the wage we would not only increase employment, we would likely also redistribute
output in a way that would increase overall productivity.
Interestingly the residuals also indicate that the more productive ﬁrms do not hold back
on investment more than less productive ﬁrms; if anything they utilize relatively more capital.
This ﬁnding, taken together with the negative correlation between the underutilization of
labor and capital residuals, suggests that one eﬀect of the labor regulations in India might
be to induce ﬁrms, especially more productive ﬁrms, to substitute capital for labor.
238C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys to examine the labor and
capital employment rates of Indian formal manufacturing ﬁrms and their relationship to
productivity and investment climate variables. We are motivated by our desire to understand
the factors underlying the relatively weak performance of the Indian formal manufacturing
sector; relative to either the Indian services sector or to manufacturing sectors in similarly
countries (e.g., China). We deﬁne measures of underutilization of labor for Indian ﬁrms as
the ratio of (1) the labor employment that ﬁrms would optimally choose if there were no
hiring and ﬁring costs at current wage costs, and (2) ﬁrms’ actual employment of labor.
Analogously, we construct measures of underutilization of capital for Indian ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that labor is underutilized in manufacturing ﬁrms operating in all states. That
is, given the amount of capital used by ﬁrms, their productivity, and the cost of labor,
ﬁrms are employing less labor than they would employ if they faced no hiring and ﬁring
costs. The extent of underutilization of labor diﬀers substantially across Indian states. In
particular, states with higher GDP per capita exhibit much less underutilization of labor.
In contrast, our results show overutilization of capital in Indian ﬁrms, though the extent of
overutilization of capital is much smaller than the extent of underutilization of labor and
does not vary a great deal across states. The overutilization of capital may be a response to
the underutilization of labor as ﬁrms and states which underutilize labor disproportionately
also overutilize capital disproportionately.
The most striking ﬁnding from our analysis of the relationships between the underuti-
lization of labor, the underutilization of capital, and productivity, and between these three
variables and investment climate variables, is that the extent of underutilization of labor by
ﬁrms is strongly and positively related to ﬁrm productivity. Also, the more productive ﬁrms
tend to overutilize capital more than the average, though not to the same extent that they
underutilize labor.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that if labor market restrictions in states with “poorly
functioning” labor markets were liberalized to the level of restrictions in states with better
24functioning labor markets, labor demand and wages would likely increase signiﬁcantly in
those states. Also such liberalization would likely increase productivity without signiﬁcant
increases in the demand for capital. This would occur both because our results suggest that
an improvement in the functioning of labor markets would cause the more productive ﬁrms
to increase their output disproportionately, and because ﬁrm productivity should increase
as labor and capital employment move towards their eﬃcient levels.
We also obtained a number of other more detailed ﬁndings. Firms which suﬀer more
production losses due to electricity outages are less productive within their states and un-
derutilize both labor and capital more than ﬁr m si ns t a t e sw i t hl e s sp r o d u c t i o nl o s s e sd u e
to electricity outages. Firms reporting more problems with corruption are shown to be the
more productive ﬁrms in their state and they also exhibit relatively high underutilization
of both factors of production. The relatively more productive ﬁrms within states are more
likely to receive loans, suggesting that loan-granting institutions are able to select out the
more productive ﬁrms. Finally, we ﬁnd that states in which a disproportionate number of
ﬁrms received loans are the states with less underutilization of both factors of production,
particularly of capital.
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Value Added in 
Industry as %    
of GDP in 2000
Value Added in 
Manufacturing as 
% of GDP in 
2000
2002 GDP per 
capita (in 2000 
USD)
India 18.2 26.3 15.6 480
Brazil 19.3 28.0 17.1 3473
China 23.0 45.9 34.7 1106
Indonesia 17.3 45.9 27.7 844
Pakistan 18.0 22.6 14.8 532
Vietnam 12.4 36.7 18.6 444
Low-Income Countries 12.3 26.6 14.1
Lower-Middle Income Countries 18.5 38.3 24.2  
Source: World Development Indicators 2005. 
Notes: Industry includes manufacturing, but also mining and quarrying (including oil production), construction, 
and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water). Lower-income countries and lower-middle income countries are 
defined based on the World Bank classification. 
 
 
Table 2. Growth in Sectoral Value-Added across Countries 
 
1995-2000 2000-2005 1995-2000 2000-2005 1995-2000 2000-2005
India 28.1% 38.4% 13.7% 14.9% 48.4% 50.3%
Brazil 5.7% 5.6% 17.3% 23.7% 26.5% 31.8%
China 57.6% 67.4% 18.5% 21.2% 57.3% 61.2%
Indonesia 14.6% 27.5% 7.0% 17.3% -2.4% 35.7%
Pakistan 17.1% 56.6% 26.5% 12.0% 20.9% 29.9%
Vietnam 70.3% 73.8% 24.2% 20.7% 31.9% 40.0%
Growth in Value Added in 
Manufacturing
Growth in Value Added in 
Agriculture




Source: World Development Indicators 2005.  
Note: The table shows for each sector growth rates in total value-added (in constant local currency units) between 
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Table 3. Sales Generating Function Estimates 
 
All Obs.










( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
L 0.710 0.740 0.669 0.669 0.293 0.387
[0.034]*** [0.046]*** [0.049]*** [0.049]*** [0.095]*** [0.105]***
K 0.343 0.289 0.330 0.203 0.316 0.295
[0.026]*** [0.033]*** [0.110]*** [0.114]* [0.098]*** [0.120]***
Temporary L 0.148 0.147 0.137 0.137 0.129 0.129
[0.024]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.034]***
Returns to Scale 1.201 1.176 1.136 1.009 0.738 0.810
[0.115]*** [0.121]*** [0.145]*** [0.147]***
L (L<=50) 0.697 0.654 0.556 0.556 0.474 0.473
[0.045]*** [0.073]*** [0.076]*** [0.076]*** [0.224]** [0.229]**
K (L<=50) 0.335 0.296 0.281 0.414 0.270 0.270
[0.028]*** [0.037]*** [0.154]* [0.144]*** [0.124]** [0.129]**
Temporary L (L<=50) 0.196 0.191 0.146 0.146 0.152 0.152
[0.031]*** [0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.048***] [0.052]**
L (L>50) 0.714 0.777 0.658 0.658 0.534 0.623
[0.085]*** [0.090]*** [0.100]*** [0.100]*** [0.172]*** [0.243]***
K (L>50) 0.346 0.269 0.204 0.347 0.221 0.182
[0.043]*** [0.045]*** [0.128] [0.125]*** [0.108]** [0.153]
Temporary L (L>50) 0.086 0.103 0.092 0.092 0.089 0.089
[0.037]** [0.040]** [0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.042]** [0.046]*
Returns to Scale (L<=50) 1.228 1.141 0.983 1.116 0.896 0.894
[0.165]*** [0.159]*** [0.211]*** [0.226]***
Returns to Scale (L>50) 1.146 1.149 0.953 1.096 0.843 0.894
[0.168]*** [0.160]*** [0.185]*** [0.193]***
Number of Observations 1799 752 752 752 752 752
Panel B: Coefficients Differ by Firm Size Group
Panel A: Coefficients Same for All Firm Size Groups
OLS Olley and Pakes  Olley and Pakes 
L Static L Dynamic
 
 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ***. **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence levels, respectively. The sample includes all firms with replacement capital and investment 
data in the initial survey (covering 2001). When labor is dynamic, it is treated as another state variable (like capital 
in the Olley and Pakes framework), otherwise it is assumed to be optimized out in each period. All specifications 
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Table 4. Average Cost of Labor 
 
Year 




Andra Pradesh 2001 47.6 60.2
 2004 55.8 59.4
Delhi 2001 90.7 45.6
 2004 109.0 91.7
Gujarat 2001 87.6 53.5
 2004 108.1 48.0
Haryana 2001 99.3 56.1
2004 122.9 106.1
Karnakata 2001 87.1 70.8
 2004 104.4 29.7
Kerala 2001 55.9 35.7
 2004 57.9 33.8
Madhya Pradesh 2001 89.8 51.0
 2004 95.9 16.9
Maharastra 2001 129.9 80.9
 2004 151.9 29.8
Punjab 2001 59.9 47.6
 2004 71.2 64.2
Tamil Nadu 2001 63.0 62.0
 2004 70.8 57.4
Uttar Pradesh 2001 77.8 49.3
 2004 85.3 65.4
West Bengal 2001 84.6 50.1
 2004 92.6 80.1
Average Wages and Benefits per Worker 
 
 
Sources: Annual Survey of Industries and Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
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Andra Pradesh 2001 15.4% 8.3% 13.4% 14.0%
 2004 14.0% 9.4% 9.0% 9.3%
Delhi 2001 17.1% 13.3% 11.1% 10.0%
 2004 11.5% 15.0% 17.9% 14.0%
Gujarat 2001 16.4% 8.5% 13.8% 14.0%
 2004 10.7% 9.4% 16.8% 10.0%
Haryana 2001 19.2% 11.0% 13.0% 14.0%
2004 16.5% 13.5% 12.2% 12.3%
Karnakata 2001 12.3% 7.3% 12.9% 12.5%
 2004 11.0% 9.0% 12.2% 11.8%
Kerala 2001 15.3% 9.2% 17.0% 13.5%
 2004 13.8% 9.9% 11.1% 10.5%
Madhya Pradesh 2001 14.9% 8.6% 13.4% 12.5%
 2004 13.3% 9.5% 10.1% 10.0%
Maharastra 2001 18.4% 9.5% 13.6% 14.0%
 2004 13.0% 9.1% 10.2% 10.0%
Punjab 2001 21.8% 11.3% 13.3% 14.0%
 2004 13.7% 11.8% 22.1% 14.0%
Tamil Nadu 2001 19.9% 10.0% 11.8% 12.0%
 2004 12.2% 10.2% 10.9% 11.0%
Uttar Pradesh 2001 16.0% 8.1% 13.0% 14.0%
 2004 12.0% 10.0% 18.4% 12.0%
West Bengal 2001 15.6% 8.2% 13.3% 14.0%
 2004 8.9% 8.6% 9.9% 10.0%
From Annual Survey of Industries From Investment Climate Surveys
Average Cost of Capital
 
 
Sources: Annual Survey of Industries and Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
 
 




Level of GDP 
per Capita 
 
Uttar Pradesh 8.60 6721
Madhya Pradesh 0.37 8694
West Bengal 8.10 11825
Andra Pradesh 6.47 12290
Kerala 1.77 13157
Karnakata 1.47 13793






Average over 2001 and 2004
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India and indiastat.com. 
Note: Per capita GDP is expressed in billions of constant 1993-1994 rupees. 
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of Labor between 
2001 and 2004 
Change in Level 
of GDP per 
Capita between 
2001 and 2004
Uttar Pradesh 304.2% 6.8%
Madhya Pradesh -57.5% 11.3%
West Bengal -1182.7% 20.1%
Andra Pradesh -187.2% 14.8%
Kerala -270.3% 19.1%
Karnakata -69.9% 7.0%





Delhi 43.8% 10.3%  
 












Level of GDP 
per Capita 
 
Uttar Pradesh -0.40 6721
Madhya Pradesh -0.80 8694
West Bengal -0.72 11825
Andra Pradesh -0.88 12290
Kerala -0.63 13157
Karnakata -0.92 13793






Average over 2001 and 2004
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Level of GDP 
per Capita 
 
Uttar Pradesh 139.41 47.98 6721
Madhya Pradesh 207.37 63.06 8694
West Bengal 518.40 81.68 11825
Andra Pradesh 66.75 45.72 12290
Kerala 74.83 36.35 13157
Karnakata 41.30 33.08 13793
Tamil Nadu 81.45 61.26 14798
Gujarat 127.08 40.71 17211
Haryana 68.98 63.62 17063
Maharastra 78.88 40.39 17698
Punjab 32.23 32.11 17697
Delhi 33.41 29.41 27864




Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India and indiastat.com. 

















Share of Temporary Labor in Total Labor - Avg. State Year  6.649 15.814 0.109
[17.428] [30.086] [0.129]
Share of Workforce Unionized 23.276 -23.746 1.275
[21.952] [37.897] [0.162]***
Share of Workforce Unionized - Avg. State Year  280.012 688.058 4.249
[129.199]** [223.043]*** [0.956]***
Dummy for Firm with Loan  15.236 -7.157 0.292
[8.883]* [15.335] [0.066]***
Share of Firms with Loan - Avg. State Year  -77.554 -181.481 -1.353
[34.608]** [59.746]*** [0.256]***
Production Losses Due to Outages  -14.469 12.919 -0.6
[45.466] [78.490] [0.336]*
Production Losses Due to Outages - Avg. State Year  343.424 961.361 3.68
[200.498]* [346.130]*** [1.483]**
Corruption in Inspections 18.387 35.186 0.231
[11.099]* [19.160]* [0.082]***
Corruption in inspections - Avg. State Year -57.94 -125.275 0.492
[34.661]* [59.837]** [0.256]*
Number of Observations 1500 1500 1500
"R-squared" 0.0136 0.0181 0.0966
Dependent Variable is:
 







Total 25351.1 75899.4 1.51
  Within 24953.7 75261.5 1.47







Total 25005.8 74524.4 1.37
  Within 24862.6 74321.1 1.36
  Between 283.4 214.2 0.01
Variance of:







Underut. of Labor 
Total -846037 69433
  Within -802619 70143
  Between -43418 -710
Underut. of Capital
Total -24250
  Within -24311




Underut. of Labor 
Total -0.0131 0.250***
  Within -0.0124 0.253***
  Between -0.0007 -0.002561
Underut. of Capital  
Total -0.051*
  Within -0.051*
  Between 0.0001
Covariance between 
Residuals of Equation for: 
Correlation between 
Residuals of Equation for: 
 
 
Notes: Seemingly unrelated regressions estimation used. Standard errors in parentheses. ***. **, and * indicate 
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Figure 1. Percentage of Firms by Size Group across Countries 




























Source: Investment Climate Surveys for Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia. 
 
 
Figure 2. Underutilization of Labor by Size Group 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
Notes: In the Y-axis L stands for employees. The figure shows for each year the weighted sum of the 
measured underutilization of labor across firms, where weights are given by each firm’s share in total 
employment for its size group. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
Note: Each dot in the figure represents one Indian state and shows the change between 2001 and 2004 in GDP 




Figure 4. Overutilization of Capital by Size Group 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
Notes: In the Y-axis L stands for employees. The figure shows for each year the weighted sum of the 
measured overutilization of capital across firms, where weights are given by each firm’s share in total capital 
for its size group. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
Note: Each dot in the figure represents one Indian state and shows the average across 2001 and 2004 of GDP 









































Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Investment Climate Surveys for India. 
Note: Each dot in the figure represents one Indian state and shows the average across 2001 and 2004 of GDP 
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Appendix 
 
A. Investment Climate Surveys Data and ASI Data 
 
The sample used for the Investment Climate Survey (also known as Firm Analysis 
and Competitiveness Survey) of India in the 2002 round was designed to cover firms in 
the top 40 industrial cities in India (located in 12 states) that account for more than 90% 
of India’s industrial GDP. In the 2005 round, the survey covered some additional states 
but we exclude them from our analysis that requires information in both 2001 and 2004. 
See World Bank (2004) and Mengistae, Xu, and Yeung (2006) for more details on the 
survey and the data.  
The measure of output used in our production function estimation is firm value 
added defined as total sales minus purchases of raw materials minus consumption of 
energy minus other costs (e.g. overhead expenses, selling and general administration 
expenses, design department). The measure of capital for 2001 is the sum of the firm 
reported value of (i) replacing all machinery and equipment at the end of 2001 and (ii) 
replacing all business premises or leasehold at the end of 2001. Since data on 
replacement cost for capital was not collected in the 2005 survey round, we constructed 
the measure of capital for 2004 based on replacement value in 2001 and on the change in 
book value of fixed assets (machinery and equipment plus land, buildings and leasehold 
improvement) between 2001 and 2004. As mentioned in the main text, our measure of 
labor is the number of permanent workers (all paid workers that are not temporary) and 
we also consider a measure of temporary labor to equal consisting of all (paid) short term 
(i.e. for less than a year) workers with no guarantee of renewal of employment contract. 
Appendix Tables 1 and 3-4 show the distribution of sample firms considered for 
our analysis of the underutilization of factors across size groups, states, and industries.  
  In Table 3 we show a measure of compensation to workers from the Investment 
Climate Surveys calculated as the average in each state of firms’ total compensation paid 
to workers (including wages, salaries, and benefits) divided by the firms’ number of 
permanent workers.  In order to compute underutilization of labor across firms, we use 
the average wage and benefits across Indian states shown in Table 3 taken from the 
Annual Survey of Industries. This survey is conducted annually and covers all 
manufacturing factories employing 10 or more workers using power and those employing 
20 or more workers without using power across all Indian states (more information can 
be found at www.mospi.nic.in). Our measure of average wages and benefits is total 
emoluments obtained as the sum of the items i) ii) and iii) below, divided by the total 
number of manufacturing workers in each state and year. 
i) Wages and salaries: defined to include all remuneration in monetary terms and 
also payable more or less regularly in each pay period to workers as compensation for 
work done during the accounting year. This includes (a) direct wages and salary (i.e., 
basic wages/salaries, payment of overtime, dearness, compensatory allowance, house rent 
and other allowances), (b) remuneration for the period not worked (i.e., basic wages, 
salaries and allowances payable for leave period, paid holiday, lay-off payments and 
compensation for unemployment, if not paid from sources other than employers), (c) 
bonuses and ex-gratia payment paid both at regular and less frequent intervals (i.e., 
incentive bonuses, good attendance bonuses, productive bonuses, profit sharing bonuses,  38 
festival or year-end bonuses, etc.). The wages are expressed in terms of gross value i.e., 
before deduction for fines, damages, taxes, provident fund, employee's state insurance 
contribution.  
ii) Employers’ contribution to provident fund and other funds: include old age 
benefits like provident fund, pension, gratuity, etc. and  employers contribution towards 
other social security charges  such as employees state insurance, compensation for work 
injuries and occupational diseases, provident fund-linked insurance, retrenchment and 
lay-off benefits. 
iii) Workmen and staff welfare expenses:  include group benefits like direct 
expenditure on maternity, day-care, canteen facilities, educational, cultural and 
recreational facilities, and grants  to trade unions,  co-operative stores meant for 
employees.  
In Table 4 we show a measure of cost of capital from the Investment Climate 
Surveys calculated as the average in each state of the interest rate on loans taken up by 
firms since 1992.  In order to compute underutilization of capital across firms, we use the 
average cost of capital across Indian states shown in Table 4 taken from the Annual 
Survey of Industries. 
  Our measure of the average cost of capital is obtained as the sum of the average 
interest rate obtained as the ratio of the items i) to ii) below and the average depreciation 
rate obtained as the ratio of the items iii) to iv) below. 
i) Interest paid 
ii) Outstanding loans: represent all loans (short term or long term, interest bearing 
or not) outstanding according to the books of the factory as on the closing day of the 
accounting year.  
iii) Depreciation: is consumption of fixed capital due to wear & tear and 
obsolescence during the accounting year and is taken as provided by the factory owner or 
is estimated on the basis of cost of installation and working life of the fixed assets.   
iv) Fixed capital: represents the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by the 
factory as on the closing day of the accounting year. Fixed assets are those that have a 
normal productive life of more than one year. Fixed capital includes land including lease- 
hold land, buildings, plant & machinery, furniture and fixtures, transport equipment, 
water system and roadways and other fixed assets such as hospitals, schools, etc. used for 
the benefit of the factory personnel. 
 
Appendix B. Underutilization of Labor and Capital in Sri Lanka 
    This appendix briefly examines the underutilization of labor and capital in Sri 
Lanka, another country characterized by restrictive labor market regulations, as discussed 
in World Bank (2007). Note an important difference in the restrictiveness of labor market 
regulations in India versus Sri Lanka. In India, the restrictiveness lies in the difficulty of 
firing workers. However, Indian workers that are fired are entitled to low severance 
payments by international standards (see Ahsan and Pages, 2005). In Sri Lanka, the 
restrictiveness lies in the very high severance payments that fired workers are entitled to. 
    Our approach is similar to that used for India: i.e., we construct underutilization 
of labor at current wage rates and underutilization of capital at current capital costs. 
However, we modify the approach given Sri Lanka's much smaller size and different  39 
regulatory environment. Sri Lanka is a unitary state and its provinces do not have 
legislative power on labor market regulations as the Indian states do. Thus, we consider 
Sri Lanka as a single labor market and a single capital market, not examining differences 
across provinces. Our analysis uses data from the World Bank Investment Climate 
Survey conducted in Sri Lanka in 2004. This dataset suffers from some caveats relative to 
India' s dataset. First, the Sri Lanka data is from a single survey round rather than two 
survey rounds. Thus, we are forced to use retrospective data for the accounting variables 
which as we mentioned in Section 2, can suffer from measurement problems. Second, the 
measure of capital used for firms in Sri Lanka is book value of capital, since replacement 
value information was not collected. Third, since we do not have data from a Sri Lanka 
census source such as the Indian ASI, we use measures of average compensation per 
worker from the Investment Climate Survey, which may under- or over-estimate the true 
labor costs faced by firms in the manufacturing sector. Fourth, some numerical problems 
constrain us to estimate the production function using the standard Olley and Pakes 
(1996) technique i.e., allowing labor to be adjustable in the short-run, in contrast to India 
where labor was assumed to be fixed in the short-run. However, our production function 
estimation allows for different coefficients for firms employing more than 50 workers 
and for firms employing less than 50 workers, as in the case of India. These caveats 
imply that the numbers below needs to be taken with a lot of caution, as they are only 
broadly indicative of the patterns of underutilization of factors. In particular, one should 
not compare the magnitudes of underutilization of factors across India and Sri Lanka 
since they are based on different data and on production function coefficients estimated 
using different techniques. 
Our main finding is strong evidence of underutilization of labor across 
manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka. Overall we estimate underutilization of 1.1 times 
current manufacturing employment in 2003. Underutilization of labor is estimated to be 
positive for every size group of firms. We also calculated what the wage would have to 
be for firms' current employment to be "statically optimal" (i.e. the wage equal to a firm’s 
marginal revenue product of labor at its current employment level). This wage averaged 
2.1 times the current wage rates in 2003. As mentioned in Section 3, one has to be careful 
with the interpretation of these magnitudes. These figures do not imply that if there were 
no hiring and firing costs and constraints in Sri Lanka and firms were maximizing profits 
they would increase their employment by 110%. If firms started increasing their 
employment, wages would rise, output would rise and the prices of the firms' outputs 
would fall (beyond what we are allowing for here). These two factors would moderate the 
actual equilibrium employment implications of reducing hiring and firing costs and 
constraints. 
    For manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka we also find evidence of overutilization 
of capital. Specifically, the overutilization of capital is on average equal to about a third 
of the capital stock in 2003. As in the case of India, this magnitude is much smaller than 
the corresponding magnitudes for the underutilization of labor. We also calculated what 
the cost of capital would have to be for the firm’s current capital to be "statically optimal" 
(i.e. the cost of capital equal to the firm' s marginal revenue product of capital at its 
current capital level). On average across manufacturing firms this "statically optimal" 
cost of capital was 58% of the current cost of capital in 2003. While this number is not  40 
too far from 100% recall that the underutilization of labor resulted in a ratio of current 





Appendix Table 1: Distribution of Sample Firms across Size Groups 
2001 2004
50 or less Employees   81.4% 78.4%
50-100 Employees 7.2% 9.4%
100-250 Employees 5.6% 6.7%
250 or more Employees 5.8% 5.6%




Appendix Table 2: Share of Total Employment across Size Groups 
2001 2004
50 or less Employees   16.9% 16.6%
50-100 Employees 7.3% 8.8%
100-250 Employees 12.3% 15.4%
250 or more Employees 63.5% 59.1%
Distribution of Total 










West Bengal 9.2% 4.3%
Punjab 9.0% 10.8%
Tamil Nadu 9.0% 9.2%
Kerala 3.6% 2.1%
Delhi 5.9% 6.4%
Andra Pradesh 7.6% 6.7%
Uttar Pradesh 10.0% 11.4%
Maharastra 10.8% 12.3%
Haryana 6.3% 6.9%
Madhya Pradesh 7.7% 11.5%
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Appendix Table 4: Distribution of Sample Firms across Industries 
2001 2004
Textiles 12.2% 8.5%
Garments and Leather 18.7% 11.9%
Metals and Machinery 8.8% 9.2%
Electronics 16.4% 16.6%
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 18.6% 21.2%
Transport Equipment 15.7% 21.5%
Food 9.7% 11.1%






Appendix Table 5: Definition of Variables Used in System of Equations 
 
Variable Definition
Share of Workforce Unionized Percentage of the firm's workforce that is unionized.
Dummy for Firm with Loan 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank loan or overdraft from a financial
institution.
Production Losses Due to Outages 
Percentage of sales lost due to electricity interruptions including lost production time
from the outage, time needed to reset machines, and production and sales lost due to
processes being interrupted.
'Corruption in Inspections
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports that a gift or an informal payment was
expected or requested during inspections from the tax inspectorate, labor, fire and
building safety, sanitation/epidemiology, police, environmental agencies.  
 
 
 